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1. Law in books and law in action. 
At a quick and rather impressionistic glance, the sources of what can 
be defined as ‘European Union (EU) industrial relations law’1 may appear 
to disclose a quite strong promotional institutional framework. EU law, at 
least at first sight, features a number of institutional – and properly 
promotional – principles concerning the role of social partners and, in 
particular, of European-level collective bargaining. From a comparative 
perspective, and even assuming as a point of reference those Member 
States’ constitutional systems that the ‘variety of capitalism’ approach 
classifies as ‘coordinated market economies’,2 such promotional 
institutional infrastructure is indeed quite unique. Commenting on the EU 
legal framework consolidated in the Treaty of Lisbon, Bruno Veneziani 
defined it as an ‘institutional ideal type of auxiliary legislation’,3 identifying 
– in the provisions on the role of the social partners within EU institutional 
mechanisms – at least the seeds of a model of pluralist and participative 
democracy based on the constitutional guarantee of collective autonomy.4 
By virtue of the innovative provisions contained in the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the framework of primary law sources of such promotional pattern is based 
today mainly on Article 152 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), which obliges the EU – and no longer the European 
Commission only – to promote dialogue between the social partners, 
including at a European level, while ‘respecting their autonomy’.5 Such 
provision – which is linked to Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), inspired by the principle of participative democracy – is 
                                                          
1 ‘Diritto sindacale unitario’ is the definition suggested by M. Magnani, Diritto sindacale 
europeo e comparato, Torino, 2017, p. XIX. 
2 As is known, the reference model of such systems can be found in Germany and in the 
Nordic countries: cf. P.A. Hall, D. Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in Idd. 
(eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, 
Oxford, 2001, pp. 1 ff., particularly pp. 21 ff., and more recently K. Thelen, Varieties of 
Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Solidarity, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 5 ff. The present 
chapter, and particularly the conclusions, will focus once again on the issues raised nowadays, 
in terms of EU industrial relations, by the comparative political economy approach in the light 
of the important critical contribution by L. Baccaro and C. Howell, Trajectories of Neoliberal 
Transformation. European Industrial Relations since the 1970s, Cambridge, 2017. 
3 B. Veneziani, Austerity Measures, Democracy and Social Policy in the EU, in N. Bruun, K. 
Lörcher, I. Schömann (eds.), The Economic and Financial Crisis and Collective Labour Law in 
Europe, Oxford and Portland, OR (USA), 2014, pp. 109 ff., here p. 135. 
4 Ibid., pp. 123 ff. 
5 As stated by B. Veneziani, L’art. 152 del Trattato di Lisbona: quale futuro per i social 
partners?, in Rivista giuridica del lavoro, 2011, 1, pp. 256 ff., ‘the failure to define the areas 
in which the Union will carry out its promotional function in favour of the social partners 
suggests that it is not limited to the social policy area as per Title X, Part II, or to the one 
referred to in Article 153 TFEU’. 
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strengthened and complemented, from a subjective perspective, by Article 
28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Such provision grants workers 
and employers, or their respective organisations, ‘the right to negotiate 
and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases 
of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, 
including strike action’. 
The legislative framework specifically governing European-level 
collective bargaining is even richer (and more complex), as it is based on 
several different sources that are prescriptive in nature: from the 
abovementioned constitutional-level provisions of the TFEU and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, to the interpretative communications of the 
European Commission and the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-
Making of 2003.6 The pillars of such promotional system, since the 
conclusion in 1991 of the Agreement on Social Policy annexed to the 
Protocol on Social Policy of the TEU, can be found in the provisions 
contained in Articles 154 and 155 TFEU. Article 154, which sets out the 
obligation upon the European Commission to take ‘any relevant measure’ 
to facilitate dialogue between the social partners by ensuring balanced 
support for them, envisages the suspension of the ordinary legislative 
procedure in case the social partners intend to start negotiations on the 
contents of the proposal submitted by the European Commission ‘in the 
social policy field’, in the framework of the mandatory consultation 
procedure. Article 155 reiterates that, ‘Should management and labour so 
desire, the dialogue between them at Union level may lead to contractual 
relations, including agreements’; this provision thus outlines the two 
alternative paths through which such agreements – since as early as the 
entry into force of the TEU – can be implemented:7 ‘in accordance with the 
procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the 
Member States’ (so-called ‘voluntary route’), on the one hand; and ‘by a 
                                                          
6 The relevance of such agreement is outlined by M. Peruzzi, L’autonomia nel dialogo sociale 
europeo, Bologna, 2011, pp. 177 ff. 
7 Based on the way of implementation chosen, European collective bargaining is classified 
either as ‘institutional’, ‘strong’, or ‘strengthened’ (if it is channelled through the legislative 
route), or as ‘autonomous’, ‘weak’, or ‘free’ (if it is implemented through the voluntary route); 
cf. more recently M. Magnani, Diritto sindacale, cit., pp. 13 ff.; B. Caruso, A. Alaimo, Il 
contratto collettivo nell’ordinamento dell’Unione europea, WP CSDLE Massimo D’Antona, 
INT.87/2011, available online; M. Peruzzi, L’autonomia, cit., pp. 205 ff. Previously, cf. at least 
T. Treu, European Collective Bargaining Levels and the Competences of the Social Partners, 
in P. Davies et al. (eds.), European Community Labour Law: Principles and Perspectives. Liber 
Amicorum Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, Oxford, 1996, pp. 169 ff.; S. Sciarra, Collective 
Agreements in the Hierarchy of European Community Sources, ibid., pp. 189 ff.; F. Guarriello, 
Ordinamento comunitario e autonomia collettiva. Il dialogo sociale, Milano, 1992; A. Lo Faro, 
Funzioni e finzioni della contrattazione collettiva comunitaria, Milano, 1999; R. Nunin, Il 
dialogo sociale europeo, Milano, 2001. 
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Council decision on a proposal from the European Commission’ in matters 
covered by Article 153, and at the joint request of the signatory parties 
(so-called ‘legislative route’), on the other. In both cases, also in 
accordance with the amendment introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon with 
the aim of codifying a practice already implemented at institutional level, 
‘The European Parliament shall be informed’; such perspective confirms 
that the social partners are assigned a role ‘of functional substitute for the 
traditional institutions and bodies involved in European governance in 
social policy’.8 And if attention is paid to the fact that such provisions, which 
expressly promote social dialogue and European-level collective 
bargaining, fall within a context of values and goals that is ambitiously 
aimed at reshaping the traditional legislative principles of 20th-century 
social constitutionalism,9 the early-stage interpretation of the EU 
institutional framework as ‘institutional architecture in which democracy 
and pluralism compose the inner essence of a democratic state’10 can be 
easily confirmed. 
However, as soon as the focus is shifted from such core of provisions 
of the formal constitution of the EU (the ‘law in books’, as we could say) to 
the actual functioning of the European industrial relations system, and in 
particular of social dialogue and sectoral collective bargaining, the first 
impression is replaced by a more complex and undoubtedly more 
problematic vision concerning the material constitution of EU industrial 
relations law ‘in action’. Such focus shift clearly sheds light on the internal 
contradictions of the same formal institutional framework, which still 
expressly excludes pay, the right of association, the right to strike, or the 
right to impose lock-outs – i.e. the hard core of any industrial relations law 
system whatsoever – from the legislative competence of the EU (Article 
153(5) TFEU).11 On the other hand, in spite of Article 28 of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, ‘an institutional hurdle to the consolidation of EU-
level bargaining is represented by the uncertainty about the legal status of 
strike action at European level.’12 
                                                          
8 B. Veneziani, Austerity Measures, cit., p. 124. 
9 Such principles stretch from the values common to Member States ‘in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and 
men prevail’ (Article 2 TEU), to the consecration of the goal of ‘a highly competitive social 
market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress’ (Article 3(3) TEU). 
10 B. Veneziani, Austerity Measures, cit., p. 135. 
11 Concerning such contradiction, cf. only Lord Wedderburn, Freedom and Frontiers of Labour 
Law, in Id., Labour Law and Freedom. Further Essays in Labour Law, London, 1995, pp. 350 
ff. 
12 T. Treu, La contrattazione collettiva in Europa, in Diritto delle relazioni industriali, 2018, pp. 
371 ff., here p. 397. On this issue, cf. mainly G. Orlandini, Diritto di sciopero, azioni collettive 
transnazionali e mercato interno dei servizi: nuovi dilemmi e nuovi scenari per il diritto sociale 
europeo, in Europa e diritto privato, 2006, 3, pp. 947 ff., and more recently F. Dorssemont, 
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This chapter will focus on the clumsy interaction between the formal 
and the material constitution of EU industrial relations law, outlining the 
ambiguities and contradictions that have marked the EU’s institutional role 
in the frail European industrial relations system that has gradually emerged 
along the lines of the abovementioned set of formal constitutional 
provisions. We will argue that the initial phase of support for the so-called 
‘institutional’ bargaining and, to a certain extent, of sectoral social dialogue 
has gradually overlapped with – and been replaced by – the reversal of the 
promotional role played by supranational institutions.13 Such reversal, 
triggered by the economic and financial crisis started in 2008,14 
undoubtedly favoured – in a context of creeping renationalisation – the 
trajectory of neoliberal rationalisation of national industrial relations 
systems that has been analysed by Lucio Baccaro and Chris Howell in their 
powerful historical and comparative analysis.15 
2. The European social dialogue: the institutional 
framework. 
The types of agreements that the social partners can enter into at 
European level are usually classified based on whether the negotiation 
phase has or has not been triggered by a previous consultation initiative 
and thus by a proposal from the European Commission, or based on the 
procedure chosen by the social partners to implement the agreement.16 
The evolution of social dialogue reveals that the institutional ‘trigger’ 
represents a necessary step in European-level negotiation processes, also 
in the development phase following the Laeken summit of 2001,17 
                                                          
Collective Action Against Austerity Measures, in N. Bruun, K. Lörcher, I. Schömann (eds.), 
The Economic and Financial Crisis, cit., pp. 153 ff.  
13 Cf. R. Hyman, Trade Unions, Lisbon and Europe 2020: from Dream to Nightmare, in 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 2012, 28, 1, pp. 5 
ff. 
14 Among the first critical analyses, cf. C. Barnard, The Financial Crisis and the Euro Plus Pact: 
A Labour Lawyer’s Perspective, in Industrial Law Journal, 2012, 41, 1, pp. 98 ff. Similarly and 
more recently, cf. L. Bordogna, R. Pedersini, What Kind of Europeanization? How EMU Is 
Changing National Industrial Relations in Europe, in Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni 
industriali, 2015, 146, pp. 183 ff. 
15 Supra, footnote 2. 
16 Cf. S. Smismans, The European Social Dialogue in the Shadow of Hierarchy, in Journal of 
Public Policy, 2008, 28, 1, pp. 161 ff. 
17 Concerning the relevance of the Laeken summit in the promotion of a more autonomous 
social dialogue (to overcome the phase of support for macro-bargaining with a quasi-
legislative purpose, occurred in the 1990s), cf. M. Peruzzi, L’autonomia, cit., pp. 33 ff., as 
well as R. Dukes, C. Cannon, The Role of Social Partners, in A. Bogg, C. Costello, A.C.L. Davies 
(eds.), Research Handbook on EU Labour Law, Cheltenham (United Kingdom) and 
Northampton, MA (USA), 2016, pp. 89 ff., particularly p. 94. 
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characterised by the thinning-out of the ‘shadow of the law’,18 gradually 
replaced with soft-law institutional interventions, as well as by the social 
partners’ consequential preference – albeit on different grounds – for 
autonomous bargaining.19 It is not by chance that the agreements entered 
into without a previous proposal by the European Commission can be found 
only at sectoral level, where the institutional ‘shadow’ is guaranteed by the 
negotiation framework itself (the Sectoral Dialogue Committees set up 
pursuant to Commission Decision 98/500/EC), and the European 
Commission’s intervention often makes it possible to overcome decision-
making deadlocks affecting the social partners. 
The relevance and impact of the institutional trigger do not emerge in 
the driving phase only. If the negotiation process starts after a consultation 
phase, this brings about the suspension of the legislative proposal pursuant 
to Article 154 TFEU and, as explained by the European Commission in a 
2004 communication, the existence of such institutional self-restraint 
justifies the two-fold supervision role played by the European Commission 
itself in relation to all agreements that have been ‘triggered’, including the 
autonomous ones.20 The European Commission assumes the role of 
carrying out an ex ante assessment ‘as it does for […] agreements to be 
implemented by Council decision’, thus verifying – based on a 1993 
communication21 and on the UEAPME judgment issued by the Court of First 
Instance in 1998 –22 the representativeness of the signatory parties, their 
negotiating mandate, the functional representation of interests of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as the validity of the content 
of the agreement itself. On the other hand, it assesses the sufficiently 
representative status of the signatory parties ‘with respect to the 
substantive scope of the framework agreement’.23 
The extension of such assessment to the autonomous agreements that 
have been ‘triggered’, raises a question on the possibility of considering 
also such sources as ‘institutional agreements’.24 In the abovementioned 
UEAPME judgment, the ex ante assessment of the agreement is justified 
inasmuch as it represents an alternative tool to ensure compliance with 
                                                          
18 B. Bercusson, The Dynamic of European Labour Law after Maastricht, in Industrial Law 
Journal, 1994, 23, 1, pp. 1 ff. 
19 A. Dufresne, P. Pochet, Introduction, in A. Dufresne et al. (eds.), The European Sectoral 
Social Dialogue, Brussels, 2006, pp. 49 ff. 
20 COM(2004) 557 final. 
21 COM(93) 600 final. 
22 Court of First Instance, 17 June 1998, UEAPME, case T-135/96. 
23 Point 91 of the judgment quoted in the previous footnote. 
24 According to the European Commission, ‘the development of the European social dialogue 
raises the question of European collective agreements as sources of law’, COM(2002) 341 
final, para. 2.4.2. 
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‘the principle of democracy on which the Union is founded’,25 which is 
necessary when ‘endowing an agreement concluded between management 
and labour with a Community foundation of a legislative character, without 
recourse to the classic procedures provided for under the Treaty for the 
preparation of legislation, which entail the participation of the European 
Parliament’.26 
When applying to autonomous agreements the same instrument aimed 
at protecting the principle of democracy, a reasonable question comes up: 
can such agreements be considered as an EU legislative source (albeit not 
directly biding by nature), more precisely as a ‘spontaneous production’ 
soft-law source?27 All of this refers to the problematic coordination with the 
regulative methods as outlined by the Interinstitutional Agreement on 
Better Law-Making of 2003, notably with the notions of ‘self-regulation’ 
and ‘co-regulation’ adopted thereby.28 The qualification of the autonomous 
social dialogue as an expression of the principle of democracy on which the 
EU is founded – and particularly as a specification of the principle of 
participative democracy – is confirmed in, inter alia, Article 152 TFEU, read 
in conjunction with Article 11(2,3) TEU.29 
The institutional monitoring on the ‘triggered’ agreements is not 
carried out only at the moment of their conclusion, but also during the 
implementation phase, should the European Commission ‘conclude that 
either management or labour are delaying the pursuit of Community 
objectives’, as well as ex post. The European Commission evaluates, in 
particular, the extent to which the agreement has ‘contributed to the 
achievement of the Community’s objectives’, considering – in case of a 
negative assessment – the possibility of putting forward, if necessary, a 
proposal for a legislative act or, during the implementation phase, the 
possibility of exercising ‘its right of initiative’. The social partners’ choice to 
opt for the implementation of the agreement via voluntary route is 
definitely not immune from institutional encroachments. The European 
Commission holds that ‘preference should be given to implementation by 
Council decision’, both ‘where fundamental rights or important political 
options are at stake, or in situations where the rules must be applied in a 
uniform fashion in all Member States and coverage must be complete’, and 
                                                          
25 Point 89 of the judgment quoted in footnote 22. 
26 Point 88 of the judgment quoted in footnote 22. 
27 G. De Minico, La soft law: nostalgie e anticipazioni, in F. Bassanini, G. Tiberi (eds.), Le 
nuove istituzioni europee. Commento al Trattato di Lisbona, Bologna, 2008, pp. 327 ff. 
28 Cf. B. Veneziani, Il ruolo delle parti sociali nella Costituzione europea, in Rivista giuridica 
del lavoro, 2006, 1, pp. 471 ff. 
29 Cf. U. Villani, La politica sociale nel Trattato di Lisbona, in Rivista giuridica del lavoro, 2012, 
1, pp. 25 ff. 
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in case of ‘revision of previously existing directives adopted by the Council 
and European Parliament through the normal legislative procedure’.30 
We do not intend to focus on the broad discretionary power assumed 
by the European Commission when linking its own decision to vague and 
arbitrarily defined conditions. It is important to stress that such criteria 
more easily orient towards institutional outcomes, that type of bargaining 
– at both inter-branch and sectoral level – that is most suitable for the 
implementation of functions being somehow ancillary or complementary to 
those typical of EU legislation. 
As concerns the inter-branch dimension, the need to review the 
directives currently in force requires the implementation – via legislative 
route – of, inter alia, the amended framework agreement on parental leave 
(Council Directive 2010/18/EU). With regard to sectoral bargaining, the 
importance of the political option – reference can be made to trade unions’ 
response at European level to the (partly unresolved) issues raised by the 
Viking case law – and the need for uniform application of legislation justify 
the institutional implementation of the agreements applying to the 
maritime (2009) and fisheries (2012) sectors, aimed at implementing, 
respectively, International Labour Organization (ILO) Maritime Labour 
Convention No. 196 of 2006 and ILO Convention No. 188 of 2007. The 
same need justified the implementation by Council decision (or, rather, 
directive) of some agreements entailing derogations to the application of 
Council Directive 93/104/EEC on working time in some sectors, pursuant 
to its Article 14: this is the case, for instance, of the agreement dated 15 
February 2012 applying to the inland waterways sector, as well as of the 
previously concluded agreements applying to cross-border traffic by rail, 
civil aviation, and seafarers.31 
As anticipated, the European Commission influences the social 
partners’ autonomy in choosing the way of implementation, not only 
upstream – whenever it deems the institutional option to be preferable 
(however, the interinstitutional agreement sets out a proper obligation in 
this regard) –, but also downstream; this occurs if a negative assessment 
has been provided of the autonomous agreement, and the European 
Commission, deeming that the Community goals have not been achieved 
properly, decides to present a proposal for a legislative act. The European 
Commission’s ex post supervision touches upon two issues: on the one 
hand, which regulatory mechanisms better guarantee the implementation 
of autonomous agreements; on the other, which parameters allow for an 
                                                          
30 COM(2004) 557 final. 
31 Council Directives 2005/47/EC, 2000/79/EC, and 1999/63/EC. 
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assessment of the results and potentialities of the autonomous social 
dialogue. 
3. Autonomous agreements. 
For the first time, the European Commission, in the abovementioned 
2004 communication,32 refers to the agreements implemented via 
voluntary route as ‘autonomous agreements’.33 Such qualification was then 
adopted by the social partners themselves already through the 2007 
framework agreement on harassment and violence at work, replacing the 
previous wording according to which such agreements were referred to as 
‘voluntary’. In the classification elaborated by the European Commission, 
the autonomous agreements fall under the broader category of ‘new 
generation’ texts, which is used to refer to the outputs of social dialogue 
whose implementation is the responsibility of the social partners 
themselves. 
The difference between the agreements under analysis and the so-
called ‘process-oriented texts’ lies in the fixing of a ‘date by which 
implementation of the various objectives must be accomplished’, whereas 
process-oriented texts are considered as mere ‘recommendations to their 
members’:34 ‘The essential difference is that agreements are to be 
implemented and monitored by a given date, whereas the second kind 
entail a more process-oriented approach, involving regular reporting on 
progress made in following-up the objectives of the texts.’35 
More recently, the European Commission has clarified that the 
autonomous agreements are binding ‘only for the signatories and their 
affiliates’.36 They ‘commit signatories and their national affiliates to 
implementation through national arrangements at their initiative 
(legislation, collective agreements, codes of conduct, joint promotion of 
tools etc.). The obligation to follow up is even stronger when social partners 
decide to negotiate an agreement that results in a Commission legislative 
proposal being suspended’; this implies an investment in monitoring 
processes and the development of assessment indicators.37 
The analysis of the numerous autonomous agreements entered into so 
far outlines that, generally, at inter-sectoral level, the process concerning 
                                                          
32 Supra, footnote 20. 
33 This paragraph draws from the arguments dealt with in further detail in S. Giubboni, M. 
Peruzzi, La contrattazione collettiva di livello europeo al tempo della crisi, in M. Carrieri, T. 
Treu (eds.), Verso nuove relazioni industriali, Bologna, 2013, pp. 131 ff., particularly pp. 140 
ff. 
34 COM(2004) 557 final, Annex 2, p. 18. 
35 Ibid., para. 3.2.1. 
36 Sec(2010) 964 final, p. 13. 
37 Ibid., p. 17. 
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the implementation and follow-up over time has not undergone any specific 
evolution since the first agreement on telework onwards. Besides the 
abovementioned change of denomination (from ‘voluntary’ to 
‘autonomous’), the only relevant modification can be found in the last 
agreement on inclusive labour markets, which sets out the obligation upon 
the social partners to promote the agreement (in addition to implementing 
it). As explained by the interpretation guide of the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC): ‘it was learned from experiences with former 
agreements that the dissemination of and awareness raising on the 
framework agreements forms a pivotal step in ensuring an effective 
implementation of it’.38 
Any attempt to verify the effectiveness of the autonomous social 
dialogue should consider the still valid suggestions provided by Gérard 
Lyon-Caen in the mid-1970s: ‘if we want at any cost […] to put forward at 
international level the legal pattern that we have called “collective 
bargaining” in each of our countries, we will fail. [This should not 
discourage us from making] an effort to consider that trade union-related 
issues could and should be treated in the future from a perspective other 
than a merely national one’.39 If the internal paradigms of collective 
bargaining are used as a reference and assessment benchmark, the 
European social dialogue will progressively ‘decline’.40 As pointed out by 
the European Commission, it is not even possible to harmonise the process 
of implementation of autonomous agreements, on the one hand, and the 
transposition of directives, on the other: ‘uniform outcomes cannot be 
expected. Any assessment of the implementation of autonomous 
agreements has to take account of their specific character and national 
industrial relations systems in general.’41 
The impossibility of reshaping European collective bargaining as the 
top level of internal contractual patterns, on the one hand, and its 
hybridisation with the soft regulatory dimension tested at institutional 
level, on the other, undoubtedly lay the basis for the identification of new 
parameters in the assessment of outcomes and potentialities of the 
European social dialogue. In this regard, the benchmarking method used 
in the most recent academic writings – in line with the assessment reports 
published by the European Commission – makes a distinction between de 
                                                          
38 ETUC, An ETUC Interpretation Guide, p. 20, available online at: 
http://resourcecentre.etuc.org/spaw_uploads/files/CES_travail%20inclusif_GB_BAT.PDF. 
39 G. Lyon-Caen, Alla ricerca del contratto collettivo europeo, in La contrattazione collettiva: 
crisi e prospettive, Milano, 1976, p. 119. 
40 P. Marginson, K. Sisson, European Integration and Industrial Relations. Multi-level 
Governance in the Making, Basingstoke, 2004, p. 90. 
41 Sec(2008) 2178 final, p. 48. 
THE EU AND THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
SYSTEMS – A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
11 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 144/2018 
jure implementation indicators (aimed at verifying the implementation of 
the agreements from a procedural point of view) and de facto 
implementation indicators (which concern the substantial effects the 
agreements under analysis have on the national labour law systems).42 
From a procedural perspective, the assessment is aimed at verifying 
whether the agreements have been implemented before the expiry of the 
applicable deadline (three years from the signature), as well as to what 
extent the implementation has complied with ‘the procedures and practices 
specific to management and labour and the Member States’, pursuant to 
Article 155 TFEU. In this regard, it is interesting to point out that the 
abovementioned provision of the TFEU does not specify whether the 
agreement always needs to be transposed into the national system, or can 
be implemented through other procedural solutions, as envisaged, for 
instance, by the agreement on crystalline silica. As per the wording 
adopted in the English version (‘shall be implemented’), the provision 
seems to set an obligation upon national trade unions to act. However, 
such obligation cannot be considered as a proper obligation to re-bargain, 
which would infringe upon the freedom of association (and collective 
autonomy) enshrined in Member States’ constitutions,43 as well as in Article 
152 TFEU and Article 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Finally, the provision targets two types of subjects, the social partners 
and the Member States, without explaining the role played by the latter in 
the implementation of the agreement.44 While in the inter-sectoral 
autonomous agreements concluded so far, the signatory organisations 
have modified the phrasing into ‘in accordance with the procedures and 
practices specific to management and labour in the Member States’, thus 
identifying the affiliated parties as the only subjects the commitment 
applies to, the actual ways of implementation of these agreements confirm 
that the legislative instrument is generally binding and concerns both the 
Member States and the social partners. Drawing from the extremely broad 
range of legislative patterns implemented (from legally binding rules, which 
                                                          
42 T. Prosser, The Implementation of the Telework and Work-related Stress Agreements: 
European Social Dialogue Through Soft Law?, in European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
2011, 17, 3, pp. 245 ff. 
43 Cf. F. Carinci, Dal dialogo sociale al negoziato europeo: gli interventi degli Stati e delle Parti 
sociali, in Protocollo sociale di Maastricht: realtà e prospettive, supplement to Notiziario di 
giurisprudenza del lavoro, Roma, 1995, pp. 81 ff., particularly p. 92. 
44 Cf. in this regard the joint declaration of the signatory parties of the Agreement on Social 
Policy (then re-annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam), which states that there is ‘no obligation 
on the Member States to apply the agreements directly or to work out rules for their 
transposition, nor any obligation to amend national legislation in force to facilitate their 
implementation’. 
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are however seldom adopted, to forms of soft or even ‘liquid law’45), the 
national organisations – in their implementation reports – point to the 
frequent implementation of coordinated and synergic action between the 
social partners and public authorities, which encompasses legislative 
interventions at national level and tripartite concertation. 
The outcomes and conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of 
the indicators on the procedural implementation of the agreements on 
telework and work-related stress are rather similar: ‘With few exceptions, 
the implementation instruments […] are similar, despite the different 
nature of the agreements.’46 The assessment of such outcomes is instead 
more complex. If one adopts as a parameter the implementation of the 
agreement in any procedural form whatsoever within the prescribed 
deadline, the assessment will be positive. If, instead, the phrase ‘practices 
and procedures’ means the regulatory patterns traditionally adopted by the 
social partners in each Member State, the assessment of the outcomes 
proves to be more complex. 
In the United Kingdom, for instance, where the decentralised social 
dialogue is combined with the use of legislative instruments, the drafting 
of non-binding guidelines at inter-sectoral level (on telework in 2003, and 
on work-related stress in 2005) cannot be regarded as an effective solution 
for the implementation of European framework agreements. The impact of 
such guidelines, in view of both their non-binding nature and the lack of 
coordination between the various levels of bargaining, has been rather 
limited at sectoral and firm level. This is the case of Denmark, where the 
agreements are not adequately transposed at sectoral level, within a 
national system whose structure is based on such bargaining dimension.47 
The analysis of the procedural indicators also points out another 
interesting aspect: the existence of a well-developed inter-sectoral political 
forum represents a pivotal precondition for the effective implementation of 
such European agreements. This confirms the hypothesis that the 
outcomes of the implementation stage are weaker in those countries 
featuring patterns of social dialogue that are more decentralised.48 
If the assessment of the two agreements is targeted at analysing the 
substantial effects on the internal protection standard, it leads to different 
outcomes. In the evaluation carried out by the European Commission, the 
                                                          
45 R. Blanpain, Introductory Remarks, in Id. (ed.), European Framework Agreements and 
Telework: Law and Practice, a European and Comparative Study, Zuidpoolsingel 
(Netherlands), 2007, p. 6. 
46 Sec(2011) 241 final, p. 30. 
47 T. Prosser, The implementation, cit., p. 267. 
48 Ibid., p. 257; cf. also B. Keller, Social Dialogues – The State of the Art a Decade after 
Maastricht, in Industrial Relations Journal, 2003, 34, 5, pp. 411 ff. 
THE EU AND THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
SYSTEMS – A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
13 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 144/2018 
difference appears to be strong. As to the agreement on telework, ‘It has 
achieved the specific objectives set by the Commission (and shared by the 
social partners) and has clearly contributed to the Lisbon goals of 
modernising labour markets and achieving a more dynamic knowledge-
based economy’.49 The implementation of the agreement on work-related 
stress, instead, ‘has not yet ensured a minimum degree of effective 
protection for workers from work-related stress throughout the EU. It 
shows that all stakeholders need to consider further initiatives to ensure 
that this goal is achieved’.50 
The fact that the agreement on telework has been successful, whereas 
the one on work-related stress has not, can be explained by two factors: 
i) the agreement on telework featured a broader scope for the 
improvement of the applicable protection standard, inasmuch as it was a 
field that had not yet been regulated in many countries and sectors; and 
ii) the provisions of the agreement on work-related stress featured a very 
low level of prescriptiveness. In this regard, the commentary drafted by 
ETUC points out that the mainly descriptive – rather than prescriptive – 
nature of the agreement on work-related stress stems from a difficult round 
of negotiations on this issue and, in particular, from the gap between the 
union side (which intended to frame the regulation of the phenomenon 
within its collective and organisational dimension) and the employer side’s 
interest in keeping the relevance of such regulation at a merely individual 
and subjective level, as well as in avoiding any explicit links with Council 
Directive 89/391/EEC. 
The impasse stemming from these conflicting positions was overcome 
through the adoption of a purposely generic definition of stress, which is 
vague from a scientific point of view, not linked to the working 
environment, as well as strongly focused on each individual situation: 
‘reading the European agreement, the wish for prescriptive certainty 
remains unsatisfied’.51 As pointed out by the European Commission, the 
problematic compromise solution reached during the negotiation round at 
European level has engendered several doubts as to the interpretation of 
the agreement when it comes to implementing it at national level. Because 
of its uncertainties, the text was not considered by the actors involved in 
the implementation phase as a useful reference point: ‘Some thought it 
was not binding enough, many that it was not exhaustive enough, or that 
                                                          
49 Sec(2008) 2178 final, p. 3. 
50 Sec(2011) 241 final, p. 32. 
51 L. Calafà, Nuovi rischi e nuovi strumenti di prevenzione nelle Pubbliche Amministrazioni, in 
G. Zilio Grandi (ed.), Il lavoro negli enti locali: verso la riforma Brunetta, Torino, 2009, p. 
190. 
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it did not add value to existing regulatory and guiding instruments.’52 
The assessment of the agreement on harassment and violence at work 
of 2007 has led to a different outcome: on the one hand, the existence of 
a more or less consolidated legislative standard on the issue has oriented 
the internal stakeholders towards a better definition of the applicable 
legislative framework or of previous interventions, rather than to the 
adoption of new instruments; on the other hand, the fact that the 
negotiating text is structured based on broad notions and formulations, 
although bringing about – once again – several difficulties in the 
implementation phase, has represented a useful element of flexibility, 
which has made it possible to devise national solutions tailored to the 
internal specific context. 
The social partners, however, finalise the assessment of the outcomes 
by framing them within an interesting analytical perspective, which is more 
strongly emphasised than in relation to the previous agreement on work-
related stress. The social partners stress that ‘the outcome is not the only 
important element, but also the process to arrive at this point. The 
discussions that took place between national social partners have helped 
to forge a better understanding of each others’ needs and the employers 
and workers they represent, in terms of tackling harassment and violence 
at work. It has also helped in generating more experience in social dialogue 
processes, which is useful for the future’:53 this occurred not only upon the 
conclusion of internal agreements, but also in the translation of the 
agreement into various languages and in the assessment of the applicable 
legislation. The implementation of the agreement has provided important 
data on the presence of gaps in the reporting activity, suggesting adequate 
actions for improvement, as envisaged at a later stage in the 2012-2014 
work plan, under the goal Better implementation and impact of social 
dialogue instruments. 
The reflection of the social partners on the implementation of the 2007 
agreement promotes an analytical perspective that is aimed at fostering 
the development of the autonomous social dialogue. Such perspective does 
not hinge as much upon the abovementioned result indicators (against 
which a definitely negative assessment should be provided inasmuch as 
the types of governance entailed have yielded disappointing outcomes in 
the opinion of those who wish to have adequate levels of substantial labour 
protection in Europe),54 but rather upon the gradual consolidation of the 
procedural trends triggered by it. From such perspective, autonomous 
                                                          
52 Sec(2011) 241 final, p. 29. 
53 Final Joint Report on the Implementation of the European Autonomous Framework 
Agreement on Harassment and Violence at Work, adopted on 27 October 2011, p. 36. 
54 Cf., in this regard, T. Prosser, The implementation, cit., p. 258. 
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collective bargaining could be described, in its potential development, as a 
path being parallel and complementary to the open method of coordination, 
from which it differs in the enhancement of the social partners’ autonomy, 
both at European and at national level, in the promotion of a ‘bottom-up 
process of softer sectoral governance’.55 The autonomy, both in the 
negotiation and in the implementation phases, can thus be considered as 
a regulatory dimension targeted at promoting a multilevel bottom-up 
action for the coordination of internal social policies. Such action ensures 
the involvement of the national social partners not as subjects that attain 
a set of goals established by someone else, but as decentralised decision-
making hubs acting in the framework of their freedom of association, also 
favouring the Europeanisation of internal industrial relations systems, 
particularly as concerns the strong heterogeneity stemming from the 
enlargement of the EU. 
The assessment on the efficiency and effectiveness of European 
collective bargaining focuses, from this perspective, on its capacity not just 
to stand as a top level that is binding, but also to function as a ‘system of 
action’ and a social construct.56 Once again, much depends on the 
benchmark: if it consists of a supranational collective bargaining system 
that leads to the conclusion of binding agreements, social dialogue shall be 
considered ‘a travesty of the real thing’.57 If the benchmark is instead made 
up of the various national labour market regimes, its outcomes can be 
assessed positively (at least in part) in view of its capacity to open up to a 
new European-level regulatory dimension aimed at the coordination of 
developments at national level. 
In any case, although we adopt the perspective chosen by Lyon-Caen 
at a time when a form of European-level collective bargaining appeared to 
be an unattainable goal,58 it should be noted that an assessment carried 
out based on specific criteria (i.e. aimed at avoiding that the practice is 
improperly treated on the same footing as the phenomenon of collective 
autonomy as emerged over time in the various national industrial relations 
systems) is expected to point out the innate weakness of the autonomous 
social dialogue. 
                                                          
55 S. Smismans, The European Social Dialogue, cit., p. 170. 
56 E. Léonard, European Sectoral Social Dialogue: An Analytical Framework, in International 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 2008, 14, 4, pp. 409 ff. A similar interpretation was provided 
also by F. Alacevich, Promuovere il dialogo sociale. Le conseguenze dell’Europa sulla 
regolazione del lavoro, Firenze, 2004. 
57 P. Marginson, K. Sisson, European Integration, cit., p. 103. 
58 Supra, footnote 39. 
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4. Inborn weakness of the autonomous social dialogue 
(and the relentless decline of the institutional social 
dialogue). 
At the moment of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, some 
commentators had already regarded the provision contained in Article 152 
TFEU as a driver for increased autonomy in the European social dialogue. 
From this ‘light’ perspective, the provision could have led ‘towards 
increased autonomy and independence from dialogue as codified in Article 
154 TFEU, [with] gradual emancipation […] from the forms of social actors’ 
participation in EU law making in the social field, institutionalised by the 
latter provision’.59 Some other scholars had pointed out that the synergy 
between Article 152 TFEU and the inclusion of fundamental social rights 
into EU primary legislation would lead to dealing with the paradox of the 
exclusion of competence, as per Article 153(5), encouraging an 
institutional intervention to support collective bargaining ‘as a reliable and 
uniform source of transnational autonomous regulation’, for instance with 
a view to promoting the conclusion of ‘a framework agreement on actors’ 
representativeness, conflict rules, or pay’.60 
However, none of this occurred and, as stated by the European 
Commission itself in the last synthesis report on the state of industrial 
relations in Europe, ‘the development of the financial and economic crisis 
impacted industrial relations in many Member States and this has left clear 
marks in the quality and dynamism of social dialogue at EU level’.61 The 
lack of relevant developments in the autonomous sectoral social dialogue 
during the years of the crisis is thus acknowledged by the European 
Commission itself, which however keeps being rather optimistic about the 
future of such dialogue.62 
                                                          
59 B. Caruso, A. Alaimo, Il contratto collettivo, cit., p. 13. 
60 B. Veneziani, L’art. 152, cit., p. 258. 
61 European Commission, Industrial Relations in Europe 2014, Luxembourg, 2015, p. 135. 
62 Such optimism can be found, albeit rather superficially, also in the so-called ‘European Pillar 
of Social Rights’: cf. COM(2017) 250 final, which, as is known, is at the basis of the political 
process that led to the solemn inter-institutional proclamation of Gothenburg in November 
2017 (cf. S. Giubboni, Appunti e disappunti sul pilastro europeo dei diritti sociali, in Quaderni 
costituzionali, 2017, 4, pp. 953 ff.). It should be noted that, in spite of such seemingly 
promotional approach, the European Commission, with a letter dated 5 March 2018 and 
addressed to the signatory parties, unexpectedly decided not to meet the joint request by the 
social partners themselves to implement, by Council ‘decision’, the framework agreement on 
information and consultation rights of public employees in Europe of 21 December 2015, 
which represents one of the few examples of somehow relevant sectoral social dialogue in 
recent years. 
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It is right to believe that also such optimism is unjustified.63 The 
employer side traditionally opposes any institutional intervention aimed at 
modifying the applicable legislative framework and the system within which 
the European social dialogue takes place.64 The pattern of autonomous 
social dialogue that has consolidated so far, beyond the drawbacks 
occurred in recent years, is still based on a weak form of Europeanisation, 
with industrial relations almost lacking any relevance within the EU, which 
mostly features the use of a ‘soft type of regulations and the non binding 
character of the majority of its products, with consequent problems of 
implementation’.65 
The economic and financial crisis – as well as the responses provided 
by the EU, which mainly hinged upon austerity principles – has discouraged 
the weak attempts made to coordinate wage policies.66 Such interventions 
remained limited from the geographical and sectoral point of view, in 
addition to proving mostly ineffective.67 They appear to be curbed since 
the onset by the macroeconomic scenario of the Eurozone, which redoubles 
gaps and divergences affecting competition patterns of national economies 
(between northern ‘creditor’ countries and southern ‘debtor’ countries, as 
well as between eastern Europe and western Europe), thus providing 
incentives actually against the implementation of forms of supranational 
coordination of collective wage bargaining.68 The Euro Plus Pact, a sort of 
summa of neoliberal (and ordoliberal) precepts,69 recommends the 
decentralisation of wage bargaining at the level at which productivity 
increases are measured (in order to bring pay patterns in line with them). 
By doing so, it sets goals being just the opposite of those that can be 
achieved by European coordination processes with at least a minimum level 
of relevance.70 
                                                          
63 For a different assessment, cf. S. Sciarra, Solidarity and Conflict. European Social Law in 
Crisis, Cambridge, 2018, p. 22. 
64 Concerns about institutional interference in the excluded matters, in particular in the 
framework of pay, are expressed also by ETUC, which has reiterated on several occasions 
that ‘Wage setting is to remain a national matter and be dealt with according to national 
practices and industrial relations systems’ (A Social Compact for Europe, resolution adopted 
by the Executive Committee at its meeting on 5-6 June 2012). 
65 L. Bordogna, R. Pedersini, What Kind of Europeanization?, cit., p. 201. 
66 Ibid., p. 197. 
67 Ibid., p. 200. 
68 Cf. S. Deakin, Social Policy, Economic Governance and EMU. Alternatives to Austerity, in N. 
Bruun, K. Lörcher, I. Schömann (eds.), The Economic and Financial Crisis, cit., pp. 83 ff. 
69 Cf. the excellent analysis by L. Oberndorfer, A New Economic Governance through 
Secondary Legislation? Analysis and Constitutional Assessment: From New Constitutionalism, 
via Authoritarian Constitutionalism, to Progressive Constitutionalism, in N. Bruun, K. Lörcher, 
I. Schömann (eds.), The Economic and Financial Crisis, cit., pp. 25 ff. 
70 Cf. once again S. Deakin, Social Policy, cit., pp. 92 ff., according to whom the inter-
governmental agreement of March 2011 crystallised austerity policies with regard to wage 
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In this context, the future of institutional collective macro-bargaining, 
governed by Articles 154 and 155 TFEU, looks similar. Such bargaining has 
indeed been affected by the same seemingly relentless decline that was 
experienced by EU social legislation through directives, a process of decline 
that gathered momentum following the EU’s biggest enlargement started 
in 2004.71 This pattern of dialogue between the social partners at 
supranational level is indeed a key instrument for social legislation. This 
‘regulatory resource’ of the EU legislative framework –72 a form of 
‘institutional’ bargaining inasmuch as it is necessary for the supranational 
legislative process – has been struck by the crisis, which has affected the 
harmonisation pattern by means of directives, no longer adopted by EU 
institutions, as recently confirmed by the so-called ‘European Pillar of Social 
Rights’.73 
After an initial, relatively successful phase, marked by the two 
directives on atypical work, adopted in the second half of the 1990s,74 also 
social dialogue and inter-sectoral collective macro-bargaining at pan-
European level have experienced a relentless decline, ending in a 
stalemate. Once the European Commission’s default legislative initiative 
has been eliminated, employers’ organisations are not so incentivised to 
negotiate; from their part, trade unions, which acted as a relatively united 
and homogeneous front until the enlargement, are now torn apart by 
internal rifts and conflicts reflecting the numerous dividing lines brought 
about by the crisis. 
What Paul Craig – when analysing the new ‘liquid hierarchy’75 of EU 
law sources – aptly defined as ‘the shift from legislation to contract’76 is 
                                                          
bargaining, with an internal competitive devaluation strategy recommended above all by the 
‘debtor’ countries of the European periphery as the only way to recover competitiveness within 
the EU. Cf. also S. Sciarra, Solidarity and Conflict, cit., pp. 32 ff. 
71 Cf. S. Giubboni, The Rise and Fall of EU Labour Law, in European Law Journal, 2018, 1, pp. 
1 ff. 
72 Cf. A. Lo Faro, Funzioni e finzioni della contrattazione collettiva comunitaria, cit., pp. 237 
ff. 
73 The ‘comatose state’ of European institutionalised collective macro-bargaining is harshly 
criticised by A. Lo Faro, Bargaining in the Shadow of Optional Framework? The Rise of 
Transnational Collective Agreements and EU Law, in European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
2012, 18, 2, pp. 153 ff., here p. 154. 
74 R. Dukes, C. Cannon, The Role of Social Partners, cit., pp. 93 ff., identified three evolution 
– or rather involution – steps of the European social dialogue, highlighting the stalemate that 
has affected quasi-legislative collective bargaining mainly since 2010. 
75 The metaphor, undoubtedly inspired by Bauman, was provided by F. Martelloni, Gerarchia 
“liquida” delle fonti del diritto del lavoro, in L. Nogler, L. Corazza (eds.), Risistemare il diritto 
del lavoro. Liber Amicorum Marcello Pedrazzoli, Milano, 2012, pp. 433 ff. 
76 P. Craig, Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and 
Constitutional Implications, in M. Adams, F. Fabbrini, P. Larouche (eds.), The 
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undoubtedly a far different phenomenon from the goal of enhancing quasi-
legislative collective bargaining, initially set in the Agreement on Social 
Policy annexed to the Protocol on Social Policy of the TEU. The phenomenon 
identified by Craig rather concerns the displacement of the sources that 
can be linked to the traditional Community method, and the emergence of 
sources characterised by the prevalence – in the framework of the EU’s 
new economic governance – of post-democratic regulatory patterns of an 
intergovernmental and asymmetrical nature. Such patterns are to be found 
mainly outside the channels of EU rule of law (as in the case of the so-
called ‘memoranda of understanding’), thus falling outside the supervision 
by, on the one hand, the European Parliament and, on the other, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).77 
5. New economic and financial governance, and 
common ‘neoliberal trajectories’. 
The global financial crisis has had – and continues to have – a rather 
uneven impact on EU Member States’ economies, worsening the 
progressively diverging trends that still pose a potential threat to the 
Eurozone. Also the impact on the various industrial relations systems of EU 
Member States, and of Eurozone countries in particular, has been 
extremely uneven; however, in this regard too, it is possible to identify 
some features, or at least some basic trends or trajectories, that seem to 
be common to all the national contexts during the crisis. 
One of the most evident features – which is perhaps also the most 
significant aspect of what Baccaro and Howel have defined as the common 
neoliberal trajectory of industrial relations systems in Europe –78 is 
undoubtedly the gradual erosion of multiemployer collective bargaining and 
notably of the role (already pivotal in the main economies of the Eurozone) 
of branch-specific or sectoral collective agreements. The crisis has certainly 
strengthened the tendency, already in place for a long time, towards the 
gradual weakening of centralised wage bargaining, mainly in terms of 
coverage,79 while reinforcing the role of decentralised bargaining (mainly 
the firm-level one). It is not by chance that the rather heterogeneous, 
                                                          
Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints, Oxford and Portland, OR (USA), 
2014, pp. 19 ff., here p. 29. 
77 In this regard, cf. in detail L. Oberndorfer, A New Economic Governance, cit., pp. 29 ff., as 
well as I. Schömann, Changes in the General European Legal Framework, in N. Bruun, K. 
Lörcher, I. Schömann (eds.), The Economic and Financial Crisis, cit., pp. 11 ff. 
78 Supra, footnote 2. 
79 Cf. also A. Jacobs, Decentralisation of Labour Law Standard Setting and the Financial Crisis, 
in N. Bruun, K. Lörcher, I. Schömann (eds.), The Economic and Financial Crisis, cit., pp. 171 
ff. 
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albeit increasingly pervasive, constellation of different guidelines, 
recommendations, ‘constraints’ that is usually referred to as ‘new European 
economic governance’ (of which the abovementioned Euro Plus Pact 
represents a particularly symbolic example) is more and more explicitly in 
favour of decentralised bargaining. 
The case of Germany – the reluctant and selfish economic hegemon of 
the EU – provides an important example as concerns the impressive scope 
of such tendency towards businesses’ gradual withdrawal from sectoral 
bargaining (which, in just a few years, has indeed experienced a significant 
reduction in terms of coverage, thanks to the massive introduction of opt-
out clauses), as well as towards a symmetrical enhancement of the 
relevance of decentralised bargaining.80 However, Germany is not a one-
off case, although it proves exceptionally relevant in view of the country’s 
economic hegemony and of the extremely rapid and profound change that 
has affected the whole tradition of industrial relations. A measure like the 
statutory minimum wage, which – as is known – was introduced as of 
January 2015, could not have been implemented (regardless of the specific 
conditions of the political context that promoted it) without so significant a 
change in that country’s industrial relations system. 
Obviously, each system has followed the common neoliberal trajectory 
in a different way; the path undertaken by the countries that – like Greece, 
Portugal, or Spain – have ‘benefitted’ from the EU’s ‘conditional’ financial 
assistance (in very different ways and amounts, as well as at very different 
times) features a strong national character (in addition to an evident 
acceleration triggered by the intervention of supranational authorities, 
embodied by the Troika).81 However, the direction of change towards a 
generalised extension of employers’ discretionary power – leading, in the 
most blatant cases (such as the UK one), to the proper de-collectivisation 
of industrial relations – is very clear and supports Baccaro and Howell’s 
argument for the existence of a common neoliberal trajectory, although, 
as is obvious, going along different institutional paths.82 
                                                          
80 As to decentralised collective bargaining in Germany, cf. T. Haipeter, S. Lehndorff, 
Decentralisation of Collective Bargaining in Germany: Fragmentation, Coordination and 
Revitalisation, in Economia & Lavoro, 2014, 1, pp. 45 ff. 
81 Cf. the comparative analysis by F. Guarriello, Legge e contrattazione collettiva in Europa: 
verso nuovi equilibri?, in Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali, 2017, 153, pp. 
97 ff. 
82 As effectively epitomised by the two authors, the argument is that ‘institutions may change 
in a neoliberal direction while remaining allomorphic’ (L. Baccaro, C. Howell, Trajectories of 
Neoliberal Transformation, cit., p. 14). The fact that the industrial relations systems have 
reacted in different ways, and in particular that ‘some centre and northern countries have 
shown a high level of resilience (as observed by T. Treu, La contrattazione collettiva in Europa, 
cit., p. 403), does not refute the argument, as the impact of the crisis, as well as supranational 
influences themselves, has been strongly asymmetrical in nature, thus engendering 
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The global financial crisis has thus undoubtedly strengthened such 
processes, which were already going on within the national systems, 
without however triggering proper processes of Europeanisation of 
collective and contractual relations. In many respects, the crisis has instead 
strengthened the push for differentiation – or even polarisation in extreme 
cases (as in the opposite economic poles of Greece and Germany) – based 
on competitive re-nationalisation approaches in relation to collective 
actors’ responses concerning mainly (but not only) wages. Nor have 
collective bargaining systems remained immune from the ‘competitiveness 
trap’,83 which – under strong pressure from fiscal consolidation and labour 
market ‘structural reforms’ recommended (and sometimes imposed) in the 
framework of the European economic governance – has pushed the various 
national systems into adopting competitive adjustment strategies often of 
a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ type, with ‘increasing risks of downward 
competition’.84 
On the other hand, also because of inaction by trade unions 
themselves,85 there has been a substantial lack of that ‘supranational 
oxygen’ that, according to renowned scholars,86 could have mitigated (at 
least partially) the increasing difficulties faced within the various industrial 
relations systems,87 favouring the adoption of coordinated responses 
attempting at identifying common collective interests at European level. 
But such interest, which should have been driven by an inexistent European 
solidarity,88 has actually not emerged; instead, as already observed, the 
                                                          
divergences and polarisation between the two groups of countries. However, the direction of 
change is always the same, although it concerns different levels of resilience and capacity to 
adapt to the pressure from the political economy of the new European governance. 
83 L. Gallino, La lotta di classe dopo la lotta di classe. Intervista a cura di P. Borgna, Roma 
and Bari, 2012, p. 81. 
84 M. Carrieri, T. Treu, Le relazioni industriali italiane ed europee: innovazioni da completare 
e convergenze da affinare, in Idd., Verso nuove relazioni industriali, cit., pp. 7 ff., here p. 23. 
As to the internal competitive devaluation strategies implemented by EU Member States, in 
accordance with the austerity policies deployed through the European governance, cf. C. 
Crouch, Entrenching Neoliberalism: The Current Agenda of European Social Policy, in N. 
Countouris, M. Freedland (eds.), Resocialising Europe in a Time of Crisis, Cambridge, 2013, 
pp. 35 ff.; W. Streeck, Buying Time. The Delayed Crisis of democratic Capitalism, London, 
2013, pp. 97 ff. 
85 Trade unions are extremely reluctant to delegate actual decision powers to the European 
level. 
86 G. Cella, Difficoltà crescenti per le relazioni industriali europee ed italiane, in Stato e 
Mercato, 2012, 94, 1, pp. 29 ff. 
87 Cf. once again G. Cella, Quale futuro per la contrattazione collettiva?, in Giornale di diritto 
del lavoro e di relazioni industriali, 2016, 150, pp. 217 ff., as well as C. Crouch, Il declino 
delle relazioni industriali nell’odierno capitalismo, in Stato e Mercato, 2012, 1, pp. 55 ff. 
88 S. Sciarra, Solidarity and Conflict, cit., pp. 133 ff. 
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push for the strengthening of dividing lines and fragmentation on a national 
basis has gathered momentum. 
To continue with the metaphor, European economic and financial 
governance mechanisms – which have consolidated and become stronger 
and stronger as a response to the crisis, notably with the Six Pack, the Two 
Pack, and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union –89 have deprived trade unions of 
‘supranational oxygen’; trade unions, from their part, have experienced a 
gradual marginalisation of their role as institutional stakeholders, in spite 
of the general provision contained in Article 152 TFEU.90 Whereas the so-
called ‘macroeconomic dialogue’, set up in 1999 with the involvement of 
trade unions, has actually become less and less relevant,91 ‘the European 
Semester has progressively ignored the involvement of social partners’.92 
However, without an active and actual involvement of trade unions in 
the European Semester, the provision contained in Article 152 TFEU and, 
above all, the so-called ‘horizontal social clause’ as per Article 9 will remain 
an empty shell, in which the pluralistic and participative tenets and the 
principle of respect for the social partners’ collective autonomy have 
nothing but a mockingly rhetoric meaning. For this reason, Bruno Veneziani 
has called for the full enforcement of TFEU provisions, with the involvement 
of the social partners in the European Semester since the preparatory 
phase of the drafting, by the European Commission, of the annual report.93 
The path towards re-launching the social dialogue in Europe should not 
consist of an abstract list of rights already enshrined in the EU’s formal 
constitution, as has been the case with the inter-institutional proclamation 
of the Gothenburg European Pillar of Social Rights. It should instead be 
actually based on new European effective economic and public policies,94 
with the goal of reversing the disruptive and – in the long run – self-
destructive drift of the ordoliberal austerity approach.95 
                                                          
89 Cf. e.g. F. Fabbrini, Economic Governance in Europe, Oxford, 2016; S. Cafaro, L’Unione 
economica e monetaria dopo la crisi, Napoli, 2017; N. Maccabiani, The Effectiveness of Social 
Rights in the EU. Social Inclusion and European Governance, Milano, 2018. 
90 Cf. the harshly critical comments by F. Dorssemont, Collective Action, cit., p. 154. 
91 Cf. L. Bordogna, R. Pedersini, What Kind of Europeanization?, cit., pp. 200-201. 
92 S. Sciarra, Solidarity and Conflict, cit., p. 30. 
93 Cf. B. Veneziani, Austerity Measures, cit., p. 141. 
94 Cf. S. Deakin, Social Policy, cit., pp. 104-105. 
95 Cf. J. Hien, C. Joerges (eds.), Ordoliberalism, Law and the Rule of Economics, Oxford and 
Portland, OR (USA), 2017, pp. 1 ff. 
